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Curious Worldview
#UkraineRussiaWar (+2 Days) - Michael Hilliard | Conflict Journalist & Geopolitical Analyst Explanation Of This Moment
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🎙️: https://atlasgeographica.com/michael-hilliard/
This was recorded at 10:00 on the 26th of February.
Michael Hilliard is the host of what is both Australia’s best and my personal favourite geopolitical podcast. The Red Line.
Michael is a journalist reporting from countries including Iran, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and also has extensive experience operating throughout central Asia and former Soviet States. He works with sources from the White House to the Taliban and also serves on various committees and councils for the Australian Government.
In This Podcast, We Speak About…
- How Michael Hilliard Is Making Sense Of All This.
- Putin’s Motivations.
- NATO, Top To Bottom.
- + Ominous Speculation Of The Future.
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- 00:00 – Introduction
- 00:56 – How Is Michael Making Sense Of All This?
- 02:36 – Putin’s Motivations, Ukraine Resistance & Russian Moral.
- 12:03 – Michael’s Experience In Central Asia Informing This Moment.
- 19:14 – The Russian & Putin Apologist Argument + Explaining NATO Top To Bottom.
- 29:17 – Ominous Speculation of The Future.
- 39:21 – Closing Thoughts.
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Episodes Of The Curious Worldview Podcast Similar To This!
- Jim Henry Ukrinae/Russia War #1
- Jim Henry Ukraine/Russia War #2
- Vijay Vaitheeswaran
Links To Michael Hilliard
- Michael Hilliard Twitter
- The Red Line Podcast
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Michael Hileed is the host of what is both Australia's best and my personal favourite geopolitical podcast, The Red Line. Michael is a journalist reporting from countries including Iran, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and also has extensive experience operating throughout the whole Central Asian region and former Soviet states. He works with sources from the White House to the Taliban and also serves on various committees and councils for the Australian government. He is a wonderful authority on this moment, and I feel privileged for having been allocated some of his time. He's coming to us from the glorious isolation of Australia's West, and we spoke about some of the following and more. How Michael is making sense of all of this, Putin's motivations, NATO top to bottom, and he also provided some ominous speculation as to where this Russian invasion of the Ukraine could go. So subscribe to the Red Line podcast for amazing cross-sectional takes of various geopolitical issues spanning from Brazil to Syria to Indonesia. And without any further ado, here is Michael Hilliard. So we're recording at uh 10 a.m. Central Europe Central European time on the 26th of February. I'm speaking with Michael Hilliard, who is the host of the geopolitical podcast, the Red Line podcast, and also spent many years as a conflict journalist in Central Asia. So, mate, I just wanted to ask you how you're making sense of all of this.
SPEAKER_01Well, I spent quite a lot of time in Russia and Ukraine and Belarus and this area of the world, and I'm not making sense of this. No one is. I mean, this is the I think the big, you know, question mark around this conflict is the fact that, you know, when people were doing the math on will Putin invade or will it not, using logic he shouldn't have innovated, and he wasn't going to invade. You know, we you know I it the math just didn't add up for him to go in for the you know obvious an international backlash, he was going to suffer for this conflict. Um and but um it's something has you know changed in his mind and it look and he has gone in uh and it's one of the most horrifying events I've seen. I have friends in Kiev, I have friends over there at the moment. You know, uh it's a beautiful city, and it's it's uh watching these cities come under a an attack not only destabilizes the sort of you know uh world balance that we've seen over the last few years that people tend not to go, you know, walk into other people's countries with full-scale invasions, but also just you know sets Russia on a course of being a very isolationist nation uh and we're already seeing major backlash towards them. Um, you know, even Russia right now is performing much worse than they we thought they would, and the Ukrainians are doing much better than they thought they would, but it's still very, very dark days for uh for Ukraine.
SPEAKER_00Can you speculate as to what's changed in his mind? Because it can't really be so simple that he's simply lost his marbles, right?
SPEAKER_01Yes. So we know he's been uh you know a bit reclusive over the last little while, and he's been reading a lot of history books. Uh, and those history books would indicate that you know Ukraine has been part of a Russia for a very long time, and you know, that for Russia to regain its former glory, because again, Putin and the majority of this sort of upper class of the military apparatus have been you know, were very active during the peak of peak of the Soviet Union, which was sort of 1983-ish. So these guys have in their lifetime seen you know the Soviet Union go from effectively the borders of Germany, or effectively Germany, uh, you know, all the way down to the edge of Afghanistan, all the way out to the Pacific Ocean, and they watch that retreat. So I think Putin is thinking about his legacy, uh, and thinking about you know what he's gonna leave behind in Russia. Uh you know, will he leave Russia as a bigger nation, you know, regaining some of its glory, clumbing itself back to a a world superpower status? Um that's you know, but again, it's that even just how did he not know that this was going to be a much harder fight? Um, you know, we uh assume that, you know, obviously no no one apart from Putin knows what's really going on, but we assume he imagined this was going to be very much like the 08 war with Georgia, where uh Sakashvili, who'd been, you know, an anti-Putin uh activist in Georgia, had effectively talked about reclaiming some of these uh breakaway republics in Georgia, much like the Donbass in Ukraine. Uh Putin walked in with a bunch of tanks and planes and bombs, and the war was over in you know, i just a few days. Um Saakashvili just, you know, the whole Georgia just, you know, uh surrendered and had no choice. Um and that kind of that destabilized Saakashvili and Georgia went on a you know, it leant back into the Russian sphere for a long time to come. Uh and Russia ended up actually coming out of that war in a better position than when it started. You know, that's we kind of think that he m uh thinking about that playbook went, well, this worked in Grozny and this worked in Georgia, why wouldn't this work in Ukraine? And it's just ignored the the fact that, you know, yeah, 2014 the Ukrainians were surrendering in in fairly big batches when the Russians came across the border in Donbass. But this is not 2014. The Ukrainians are much better armed, they're much better equipped, and their morale is much higher. Um, so it's it's a much tougher fight than than what Putin expected.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, that's been a real surprise, hasn't it? Just how remarkable the Ukrainian defense has been. I suppose, um, on according to different things that I've uh read and heard, there was almost the assumption that the uh threat um of 150,000 Russian troops on the border would be enough to sort of destroy morale and people would sort of fold, but instead it's a very legitimate resistance.
SPEAKER_01Yes, it's been very legitimate resistance. Um you know, not only have they they've been given a bunch of new arms and weapons, but they're fighting for their homeland. You know, and it's very different. You know, when Putin walked into the eastern bits of Ukraine, the Donbass areas, um, effectively he's walking into areas that are pro-Russian. That at particularly at that point in 2014, these are areas that would probably rather be Russian than Ukrainian. Whereas now he's walking into areas like Kiev, who don't want to be Russian. You know, this is uh a blind aggression. The fact that he's opened up with these airstrikes and civilians have died, uh, you know, and they they are seeing this outpouring of world support is just fueling the Ukrainians. The morale's on their side, and they're they're gonna fight much harder for this. And again, you've got to realize that quite a lot of the Russian army is still conscription. So these are Russian conscripts who you know, Russians will usually have Ukrainian friends. When you go to a bar in Moscow, you're bound to find some Ukrainians there. You know, they're being asked to invade and take a nation who they probably have friends who live there uh for conscripts, you know, uh with pretty nasty tactics. So it's it's not a it's no wonder the Russians are are going into this with less than stellar morale, uh, whereas the Ukrainians are, you know, uh willing to fight for their homeland.
SPEAKER_00Can you comment more on that last point? Because I think that's uh super interesting insight. The fact that Russian morale might actually be quite low. Uh because isn't central to Putin's whole external reasoning for doing this is that it's some sort of cultural unification and it's a way to really bolster nationalism within Russia, and therefore you would almost expect that that would be a big motivation for the Russian army. But I have heard elsewhere as well that Russian morale is actually super low. People don't want to be there.
SPEAKER_01So it's it obviously there are some Russians who are very happy to go into Ukraine or really, really want to go there and smack things around. But you know, there are a lot of other Russians who have friends in Ukraine and know that this is not a particularly helpful exercise for them. You know, it's I can't speak for every Russian, but most of these sort of morale building exercises that most of the morale building exercises are very much, you know, if you look at sort of the US morale with the Kuwait, the first Gulf War, where the US went in and knocked the Iraqis out of Kuwait in, you know, in what a month and a half with few little casualties and won the war, great. Morale was at all-time high. But with these long, really bloody wars, they tend when the body bags start coming home, that's when people tend to start going, Well, is this as good as we were hoping for? Um, you know, with Georgia it was a very quick war. With Udombas, it was a quick war. With Crimea, it was a virtually bloodless war. This is going to be a bloody war. Uh, and with all the sanctions coming in, this is going to really hurt the average Russian. So, particularly last night, some of the breaking news about Germany talking about uh cutting Russia from the SWIFT network would put Russia in the same category as Iran, where not even the ATMs work. They can barely you're Iran barely gets anything from anyone. You know, they have to become an almost completely self-reliant nation. Um Russia who, you know, when you it's not the Soviet Union anymore. You know, people actually have Facebook and they can see what's going on, and you know, people who are used to having these the you know Western uh technology and Western stuff in there, the average Russian citizen is not going to be particularly happy if you ask them, hey, are you happy to give up all your you know, nice cars and nice way of life and you know your uh your your iPod and your MacBook and everything else, uh, and in exchange we get to occupy a tiny bit of Ukraine. I don't think that's a that's a math that most of the particularly younger generation is gonna be very happy with.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, which further compounds this inexplicableness to it all from the outside, and it makes me it makes you think that there has to be more going on internally. Um, like apparently to return to Putin's motivations, apparently he's been quite COVID mad as well. Uh like really isolating himself. People had to quarantine for lengthy times just to sort of be in a room with him, etc. And I heard a great quote yesterday from the uh editor of The Economist, I forget her name, but she was sort of speculating into Putin's motivations, and she said, uh, when our great-grandchildren are reading history books, Putin doesn't want to be a paragraph, he wants to be an entire chapter. He wants the Lenin chapter, the Stalin chapter, and then the Putin chapter. Um, and if that is truly the case, that this is just a legacy grab, it makes it so much more evil.
SPEAKER_01I and this this seems like the only l explanation we can make sense because militarily it doesn't make sense. If you look at the aims of what Putin was hoping for, you know, that Ukraine stays out of NATO, then just maintaining his his breakaway republics in in the Donbass and Crimea would have done that anyway. You know, NATO you can't join if you've got breakaway republics. You know, if you wanted to keep other countries out of NATO, NATO has never been more unified than it is at this moment. You know, just you know what, a year ago NATO, you know, you hit lots of people with lots of think pieces saying, well, what's the point of NATO? You know, it's it's an old ang it's an old organization that really doesn't matter. Now we're having talks of you know Sweden and Finland and and you know even Moldova might have that conversation now uh about joining NATO. Moldova. That's a it's a big if, but yes, Sweden and Finland definitely. You know, these are countries that you know had no intention of you know fully joining NATO are now joining NATO. Um this is really, really bad for Russia. Even the fact that Kazakhstan this morning has said they will not join Russia's conflict here, and Kazakhstan is probably the second closest nation to Russia. They are very, very pro-Russia. It shows that Putin is very isolated in this conflict. And when the sanctions are going to get even worse, when even Germany, who Germany is quite close with Russia, uh particularly with the gas demands, you know, it's a major misplaying of the cards here.
SPEAKER_00So you brought up Kazakhstan there. I'd love to hear you just sort of think out loud about how your time in Central Asia and in the Ukraine as well, you spend a lot of time in that country, how the sort of your time there absorbing the culture, absorbing the politics, trying to understand former Soviet states and how their ongoing relationship with Russia develops. If you could just think out loud about how what the implications are for these states in response to what's happening now.
SPEAKER_01I think one of the major things that you seem you see everywhere, whether you go to Kazakhstan, whether you go to Russia, whether you go to Ukraine, is this weird sort of, you know, when you cut into a tree, you can tell what happened by, you know, looking down the sort of rings. And when you look at Russian society, there is a kind of bit of that as well. When you, for instance, talk to someone young who has only lived with a Putin regime and has seen you know the West and been overseas and done stuff, they're very different. So you go a generation up and you get this group of good people who are in their sort of forties now, uh, who effectively all give you the same, you know, effectively the same thing going, look, you know, Nazarbayev or Putin or, you know, Lukashenko or you know, whoever it is, they're not great. But it's not the nineties, and we do not want the nineties. Because again, during the sort of end of the Soviet era was a collapse of society for most of these countries. It was, you know, the World Bank said that to transition from communism to capitalism should be done over about a 15-year period. The US gave them effectively six weeks. Um it was such a dramatic shift in society, and it was free-for-all for a couple of years there. You know, it was not unusual that they'd just be roving, you know, uh thugs down the street with guns. Because it was such a dramatic power vacuum in some of these countries. People are very, very hesitant to go back to that, and they worry that you know, guys like Putin and uh Innazrabaev and Lukashenko and and uh um Burdimuhamedov or uh Rachmanonov in uh in in Tajikizan, all of these guys are so built into the political structure that if they were to die or leave or be kicked out of power, there could be a very dramatic power vacuum. And I think a lot of people are very nervous about anything like that happening. Putin in particular, most of the sort of big organizations in Putin, whether uh in Russia, sorry, um, like Spirabank and Gazprom and Rojnev and are are all picked by Putin. You know, if he were to die, it would be a, you know, why am you know most of these oligarchs who had got to the positions they are, you know, they may not keep their position because they know that the future oligarch that comes in would probably want to choose a whole new set of much more loyal oligarchs. So it's you know, there's an entire system to make sure Putin stays where he is. And also in in Russia and and all these countries, you know, you see the votes are and there's usually one person who gets almost all the votes, and then there's a couple of tiny little parties that get a little bit here and there. So for instance, the next most popular uh gov you know uh party in Russia is the Communist Party. Uh and the guy in charge is Ganardy Zanayev, who was the same guy in charge of the Communist Party in 1991. Um, you know, it's there is you know, there is no opposition ready. You know, if if the Republicans were all to die overnight, their democrat there is a Democrat there to step into power. There is just not that system in these countries, unfortunately, because of political repression mostly. So it's very it's so it's very worrying uh that if this really does, you know, pop off and it does Putin does suffer a lot of blowback, and we already are seeing protests in Russia. Uh again, and you've got to give Russian protesters their due, even though the numbers aren't huge at these protests, they know that the moment they step out that's it. Like they will be tracked. Um so eve if you know there's you know, even just a couple of thousand people who are willing to get out on the street, it means that there's many more who are angry at this. And a lot of Russians have not even begun to feel the pinch of how bad these sanctions will be against them, particularly if they get cut from the Swift network. When that happened to Iran, Iran lost about 60% of its economy overnight.
SPEAKER_00Holy crap. What do you know what that percentage might look like um relative to Russia?
SPEAKER_01It'll be a little bit less, but it'll be around that ballpark. Uh, because if they cut from Swift network, um, it will drastically reduce the amount of countries they can do trading with. So far, it looks like the only ones who would be willing to do any business with them would be India and the Central Asian republics. But you also got to realize that this is the ruble has just had a bunch of value cut from it as well. Yeah, it's the ruble is worth is is dropped in value, which makes everything more expensive for people in those countries. But also all of these all of these uh uh Central Asian republics, as well as a lot of Russians, keep their reserves in rubles. And if the ruble is worth less, then now they their fortune just got cut by 30% just because of one decision that is not going particularly well for the Russians.
SPEAKER_00Uh you said something really interesting there, how sort of speculating as to motivations for why the Central Asian uh countries, former former Soviet countries, would not want Putin to die because they wouldn't want the chaos of the power vacuum that would come after it. Um I think that's a really interesting take because it sort of credits Putin again for how effective he's been at solidifying his power. Like even when he's gotten it such that it's in everybody's disincentive for him to go.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, it's it's you know, again, this is not what I personally feel. I think Russia could re possibly recover after willing could recover in a post-Putin era, but a sudden power vacuum would you know would be absolutely catastrophic there for a while. And again, it's it's a lot of people are willing to go through that, you know, they're willing to if if they Russia comes out the other side of it with a better c uh leadership, that's great. But there is a large percentage of people, particularly those who live through the 90s, who are adverse to it. Um particul in most Putin's been very good at making sure his military guys are paid off, his oligarchs are paid off. You know, the people that need to be making money to keep the train running, they're paid off. So if let's say there was, you know, Putin was to get overthrown and they have some democratic leadership and they have some, you know, someone who is really pro you know actually a good leader for the country, a lot of these power brokers in Russia who got very rich off the Putin administration, uh, would then go, Well, I'm not gonna get the same kickbacks I got. Why would I pick this guy over Putin? So even if they have all the support from the people, you know, a rival administration may not have the support of the army or the navy or uh the oil tycoons or the real estate tycoons or the transport tycoons, uh, and those people in Russia have pretty unfettered power.
SPEAKER_00Um, I wanted to ask you what you made of the Russian and Putin apologists. Um, because I mean you see I I've seen quite a lot of it over the last few days, and I'm not quite sure what to make of it as well, because I think you should be sceptical to a overwhelming one-sided argument. Um, but nonetheless, it's a fucking hard argument to swallow. So, what do you make of it?
SPEAKER_01Some of them come from very weird sources. I mean, Fox News and Tucker Carlson particularly was a bit of a where did that come from? Yeah, that was kind of bizarre. You know, it's it's been very odd watching some of these people justify this action. You know, this is because again, it's very different to what Putin usually does. Putin usually does this these kind of salami slice tactics, you know, just that you know move the fence move the fence a few inches at a time.
SPEAKER_00Regularly in some cases.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. Yeah, in South Ossetia very much the case.
SPEAKER_00Yeah.
SPEAKER_01Um But you know, when you talk, you know, so when he talks about Donbass and says, hey, these people are very pro-Russian, if we had a referendum, they would want to join Russia. I actually kinda you know, there is there's an argument to be made. When you talk about Transnistria, where you speak to go, you know, when you go there, people would prefer to be part of Russia than Moldova for the most part. But Kyiv, that's a step way in the other direction. This is a, you know, and watching these people try and justify it is I guess because they would either have to admit they were completely wrong, which I think a lot of people do find quite difficult, uh, or go against all of their friends and family. And again, there is if you have a leaning view of Russian history, and I'm gonna that's a very polite way of saying that, um, you can you could justify that, you know, Ukraine was part of Russia for many years, and it was only made an independent country by effectively the the Germans in World War One and then the Soviets gave them independent status, you know, a bit later on. I mean, it's not a thing I believe at all. But if you had only read those books and you only read that point of view and that's all you knew, and you never stepped outside your bubble, because we do live in an era where you can, you know, where you can l you watch one set of television and one set of movies and one set of podcasts and whatnot, and you can be completely cut off with a different set of interviews. You never have to hear the other side. You never have to hear the other side. Um I also find a lot of it interesting as a lot of the commenters here have never been to Ukraine or Russia, and again, you know, it's the same reason that you know you've travelled a fair bit, you know that the moment you you tell people, hey, I'm going east in Europe, they go, Oh, cool, I've been to Prague too. Um, you know, it's Yeah, yeah, a lot of people kind of view everything east of Germany as this well, it's just old Soviet bloc. Uh but don't realise that there is Differences between Latvia and Lithuania, between Ukraine and Russia, between Georgia and you know uh and and Belarus. So yes, it's it's very difficult, particularly the fact they speak similar languages as well. Um, you know, yeah, it it's a it's an argument I didn't think people would be making, but I think they are very much a minority at the moment. I think even the people who are on the fence and even the guys who would go, well, you know, these self-autonomous republics have their right to, you know, decide their fate, and you know, why should a pro-Russian minority be answering to Ukrainian nationalists, those kind of guys, even they they a lot of those guys are switching or very, very quiet at the moment.
SPEAKER_00I hear a lot about how this is a response to NATO offering Ukraine or at least encouraging Ukraine to uh either join NATO or at least be uh sympathetic with NATO or X, Y, and Z. Even if the Ukraine became a NATO force, in my mind, and this just could be my own sort of you know political ignorance, it it it doesn't count as a threatening move, and especially doesn't justify some sort of invasion. Because it's not like NATO's going to invade Russia, you know. Is this is this a kind of sort of innocent argument from me, or or you know, is there some weight to that?
SPEAKER_01So it it there's an inter this is a sort of I'm gonna give you the the not my personal point of view, but what you hear from most Russian officers. Now, when you go into towns, you know, that can be a tiny town of 200 people, and there are only two guaranteed things. There will be a liquor store and there will be a monument to the great patriotic war, which is World War II. Um they view that war so embedded in their history that it it it is very difficult for anyone from the West to understand it because it made such an impact on the country. You know, everyone is taught that Hitler came from you know what is Poland today and smashed all the way up to up to Moscow. And the Russians have always been very, very, very nervous about that. Because there is, there's almost no natural obstacles between Berlin and Moscow. It's just flat European plane. So, you know, when Putin was a younger man, when the Soviets were at their peak, you look at the actual defensive lines of the Soviet Union, and they were, well, NATO can't invade through Georgia and Armenia because the Caucasus mountains are there, and as we know, mountains are very difficult to invade through. Okay, so that's safe. Uh they can't come up through Bulgaria because, well, that's a bunch of mountains as well. We're safe there. They can't come through Hungary because of the Carpathian Mountains, that's awesome. So the only place that NATO can push from is from effectively East Germany up, which means there's now, what, 1200 kilometres between NATO's nearest troop and Moscow. And Russia can take its, let's say, 200 divisions and concentrate them all in East Germany, because that's the only bit it really has to defend hard. Fast forward to sort of now, and NATO is in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which is you know, a 12 the bases in Estonia particularly are a 12-minute flight from St. Petersburg. Um, and there's nothing natural in the way to stop them. You know, with the current uh defensive lines, Russia now has to defend the three Baltic states and has to defend the Belarusian border. Um, you know, and that's a that's a huge amount of territory to defend. So the troops already stretched. If Ukraine was to become a member of NATO, that would mean that would effectively be adding around 2,000 kilometres of flat, difficult to defend territory that Russia now has to station permanent troops on and defend. So it stretches their already stretch forces even further. So Russia then goes, once they're that thin, there's nothing that can stop an invasion. And they're, you know, once you kick off from from sort of Khalakiv, you're only you're only 400-500 kilometres from from Moscow. And again, it it's difficult to understand for people who don't follow Russia too diff uh closely, but Moscow is the linchpin in everything. If you want to fly from Nizhny Novgorod to Romansk, you have to go through Moscow. If you want to go from Chernagov to Volgograd, you've got to go through Moscow. If you want to go from Kursk to Ufa, you've got to go through Moscow. Everything goes through Moscow. So you capture Moscow, it becomes really difficult to run Russia. So again, this is not my personal point of view, but it's something that, you know, a lot of Russian defense analysts go, we need to push and get some distance between us and where NATO is, because they watch NATO, NATO's troops get closer and closer and closer and closer and closer, and the moment that Ukraine joins NATO, that's stretching the lines way too thin, and there's no chance of defending the Russian heartland. But saying that though, Russia NATO can't Ukraine can't join NATO anyway, because of its territorial disputes in Donbass, Luhansk, and Crimea.
SPEAKER_00Okay. But underpinning all of that is the sort of boogeyman idea that NATO would be an invasive force. Like they they might literally uh be an offensive threat to Russia. And I understand, like you just said, if you go to any town, there'll be a liquor store and then a monument to the Great War. Um that that memory exists so fervently in their culture, but isn't also underpinning that memory the fact that it was this it was the threat of Nazism, and there just isn't an equivalent of that in Europe at the moment, and you know, you could be a fool to say that there wouldn't be in the future, but do you understand what I'm trying to say here? Yeah, I just I I don't see why it's a threatening position, even though it exposes them to all of these military weak spots. Why is it threatening that NATO would have any sort of ambition to invade?
SPEAKER_01Again, this is a it's very difficult to understand. And the the point of view they'll give you is that look, when you know the Russians put missiles in Cuba, look how much the Americans freaked out, and now we have to be comfortable with the Americans putting troops in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and and all these other countries uh and putting missiles that close as well. You know, they you know the Americans and the NATO troops will say, No, we're never going to invade Russia. And I really do not think they ever will. That's the moment you do that is we're just counting down to nuclear war. No one wants that. But then the Russians will go, Well, if you're not going to invade us, then why are you putting so many troops on our borders? And that's where you get this chicken and egg problem. Um, so again, I we both know that NATO won't do it. NATO can, at the best of times, apart from this week, uh, pick what colour pens they really want to use. Um, but right now it's you know uh Russia if Russia has it in their mind that the world is is turning against them and that more troops are moving in. And the same reason the Americans would would freak out if the Russia put lots when Russia put lots and lots of troops in Cuba, the Russians are gonna freak out when the Americans put lots and lots of troops near them. Uh and again, this is a again, we're dealing with a leadership that's been there since the 80s, since it's been sitting there since the 90s. They've seen how, you know, in your lifetime, they've seen the the NATO borders move from Germany up to Estonia.
SPEAKER_00Nice. Thanks for that, Michael. That actually does add uh quite a lot of colour to understanding why this might be going on. I mean, it's so far from excusing an invasion, but at least understands at least informs a little bit of the motivation. Can I ask you uh to just speculate as to how you think this ends? Does it stop with an occupation of Ukraine or does it sort of uh spill out in other places?
SPEAKER_01Again, I it's so hard to pick at the moment. I think Putin is hoping that he can take um take Kiev and install a you know boost one of the the Ukrainian oligarchs um you know who will then go, I'm the peacemaker, you know, this war has gone on long enough, you know, let's get rid of Zelensky and we will uh we'll make peace with the Russians and we can form a peaceful union between us and rah rah. I don't think that's gonna happen though. You know, Zelensky, when this happened, was under a a few scandals. He's been again, you have to judge Ukrainian politicians on a bit of a curve, and that's horrible to say. But you know, he's yes, there is some corruption there, but far less than most administrations in in Ukraine. Um famously corrupt. But you know, there was in the fact that Putin's putting calls out saying, you know, Ukrainian troops go and arrest Zelensky right now is you know, you've got to think that he must be at least must be getting delusional reports that if he thinks that you know the Ukrainian soldiers are going to arrest Zelensky and and hand him over. Um, you know, again, this is a playbook that worked for Russia in 2008, and I think he's misjudged on how much the Ukrainian population would back Zelensky in this one. So it in i it's either going to be a a tremendously bloody fight, um, or it's or Russia will effectively take some ground, hold it, and then go from there. But right now we're already seeing some fighting in the uh in the sort of north west suburbs of Kiev. Uh but the special forces who came in and were supposed to probably take the city quickly have all been eliminated by the by the Ukrainian army. So Russia is knowing they're gonna have to bring in. See, Russia right now is trying to effectively do what it can to make this a less casualty filled war because they need something to you know hold back with. You know, Russia right now, you know, if you categorize the Russian army, it's quite often viewed as a it's an artillery force with a with a detachment of infantry. Um the Russian tactics in in places like Syria have been very much a, you know, i it's very easy to occupy a car park, is a is something I've heard from a Russian officer. Um, which means it's very easy to take a city if you flatten it. Um they're not doing that tactic at the moment because they'll be threatening, you know, the hope is that they can do what they did to Georgia and say, look, if you surrender, we don't move to that tactic and we save a lot of civilian lives. Do you want to turn this into another Grozny? Um so they but this but their tactics of of you know trying to keep it to a limited conflict, trying to, you know, rather than using you know, right now they've been using a lot of cruise missiles to hit targets, and cruise missiles are designed for that that reason. You know, if you're gonna use a cruise missile, you can hit a single house or a single hangar, or depending on how accurate they are, you can hit you know a very small area. Whereas the Russians in the past have gone with carpet bombing, uh, gone with large, un uh unguided missiles. So effectively just running a plane over the top and just blowing an entire you know block to smithereens, which kills a lot more civilians and will make this conflict a lot worse. You know, for sure. That's what we fear is that the Russians start losing at the in these small scale battles where they're trying to keep the civilian casualties to as to as low as possible, uh, that they will move to this next stage of you know just flattening blocks. It turns into a very, very, very bloody war. That's what we're all desperately hoping doesn't happen. We're hoping Putin doesn't get to that point, but he's also stuck in a position now that if he's if he actually retreats, if he goes, Yep, I I made a mistake, you know, I and calls it there and runs across the bo runs back across the border, that would be so destabilizing for his position at home. Um so it's almost now a thing of can is there a way we can find a way to live, let Putin save some face and be able to retreat um and not have to intensify this war. So but again, I don't think we should be rewarding Putin for this um because the fact if if if we do just if he gets away with this, it will send giant messages to every other country around the world that you know the balance of power we've had where international borders do not change by force uh will be thrown out the window. And that's something that you know no one wants to see. So very, very dark days ahead, regardless of what happens.
SPEAKER_00Okay, so in short the ambition is Ukraine. Worst case scenario is that the Ukrainian defense is so effective that it requires Russia to um escalate their offense, which would involve the the the car park sort of route. Um is there any is there any sort of threat of spillover elsewhere? Not necessarily invasive spillover, but how this conflict can spill over in other places? I'm thinking China, but not necessarily just something that you've seen or read or heard.
SPEAKER_01So China's watching this very closely and seeing you know how the Americans react with this uh and you know taking notes for Taiwan because Taiwan's in a very similar position to this, to the what the Ukrainians are. That whilst being technically a protectorate of America, they're not officially on then, you know, the documents haven't been signed, um, which Ukraine kind of fit in that same category. So if Ukra if America was to do nothing and say, well, this isn't our problem, we defend NATO, not NATO partners, then China would view that as a oh look, okay, well they're not going to defend Taiwan when push comes to shuffle. You know, uh Moldova is very nervous at the moment. Obviously, Moldova has a breakaway republic, uh, Transnistria, uh, and Russian troops are looking like they're landing in Odessa uh in the next in either, you know, at the moment with preliminary raids and and likely bigger strikes to come. Uh and Odessa's only a very small amount away from Transnistria. So, you know, the Russian uh 71st or the 14th guards that are sitting in Transnistria. Um Russia's terror, you know, Moldova is terribly worried that if these troops are activated, do they push into Moldova and take it while everyone's busy? Or do, you know, do they get supplyed by more Russians? What happens there? Or will Moldova you know be asked to join the war and you know and and get involved? And on top of that, there's obviously the refugee problem that is already prevalent throughout Romania and Poland and all these other countries. Uh and then if we took a little bit macro from that, Russia has been effectively uh making sure they that these European countries get less and less gas over the last little while, has been reducing the amount of gas they send into Europe so that there's almost no reserves left in Germany, France, and Poland and all these countries. Because there was the hope there that when if this conflict did kick off, then countries like Germany would be very nervous to go against Russia, going, well, if we stop our gas export imports from Russia, then the whole of Germany goes very cold and our electricity is is in doubt because we've got rid of most of our nuclear plants, you know, our environmental policies are up the creek because you know the whole environmental policy was was predicated on using natural gas over a lot of other methods. You know, with no gas in reserves, there was a sort of hope there by the Russians that the Germans and the Poles and a few other people would stay out of this and go, look, you know, Ukraine's not our business, we desperate we still need the gas to flow. Uh but the fact that Germany's now even talking cutting Russia from SWIFT just shows that this was uh uh ten bridges too far, uh a movement for for Moscow.
SPEAKER_00So, in short, you can sort of surmise that Putin has greatly underestimated Ukraine's resolve, Europe's uh sort of resilience as well to an economic shock, and um just overall he's sort of miscalculated this uh this play.
SPEAKER_01I I'd I'd say so. You know, as I said at the beginning of this interview, I think the thing that most analysts, you know, and I I was in that camp as well. You know, we all looked at this build-up on the Russian border on the Ukrainian border, we went, this is Putin banging his chest, which he does all the time. Um, and as you know, we saw it, you know, when I went from a sort of like 5% chance of invasion to 10% to 20% to 40% to 50-50. You know, even then, on the last kind of couple of days, you know, I was saying it's a 50-50 shot, and if I was a betting man, I'd say he doesn't go in because of the fact it just makes no logical sense to do this. You know, mo Russians are usually fairly good at making this sort of cost analysis on these kind of invasions. When it came to Crimea, for instance, by sending in little green men to do that, you know, and taking Crimea and not moving any further than the Russian areas, they effectively got exactly what they wanted that Ukraine can't join NATO and Crimea, which is incredibly important to the Russian Navy and defense apparatus, you know, without actually having to go to war. It was that is the cost worth the the the risk? Yeah, that cost was worth the risk. This, this is not. You know, they're gonna lose a lot of men, they're gonna lose a lot of support in in uh internal Russian politics, and at the same time, this is gonna hurt Russia for a long time. To if if they can if they have a change in administration, then who's gonna recognise that administration? Um, you know, this is not going to be a Georgia 08. This is a whole new kettle of vision. I don't think Russia was ready for that.
SPEAKER_00Like we were saying uh just before we started recording, it's just so ridiculously surreal that there is this type of war happening in our in our lifetimes. It's something that, you know, I I suppose you maybe saw a little bit more up close during your time in Central Asia, but at least these large-scale country trying to take another country. I mean, we sort of would have just read about it and heard about it and watched in documentaries and so forth. Are you speaking with your friends in the Ukraine and have you like uh been able to get a sense for what they're thinking and feeling?
SPEAKER_01It's shock. You know, it's weird, you know, everyone in Ukraine, you know, we were sort of talking right up until the and we still are talking to friends over there at the moment. It was just they've lived with this de facto war since 2014. They've had Russia do operations on their borders all the time, and you know, to them it was when people go, there's an invasion coming, they go, Yeah, boycry wolf, who cares, not gonna happen. You know, Kiev is a city like any other any other European city, it's a beautiful modern place. It's you know, for people who haven't been in that area of the world, it's very similar to your Prague's or your your your Germany's or you know, any of these guys. So to you know, imagine this very modern, very normal city as a site of a war zone. You know, it we're not talking about a country village out in the east of east of Ukraine. We're talking about major cities in like Odessa, Karakiv, um, Krematorsk, you know, big cities here who are now becoming war zones. And this is something we just we haven't seen in Europe since, you know, effectively the Balkan Wars in 1991. And even then, that was, you know, it was looking like a powder keg. You know, there were people there on the ground who wanted this fight from the get-go. Whereas Ukraine, you know, Ukrainians and Russians, as much as they might, you know, be compet competitive in sport and whatnot, generally all get along. Um, you know, it's not like, you know, with my travels, you know, I you can hang it out with lots of different nationalities. When you go to someone like Armenia, Azerbaijan, they absolutely hate each other to the to the end. You know, um you can't you cannot sit at a table with an Assyrian and a uh and an Armenian. Whereas almost every single time I've ever gone drinking in in both uh Moscow or Kiev or you know any of these major cities in either of those countries, there is always going to be a couple of Russians at the table and a couple of Ukrainians at the table, and everyone gets along. You know, their languages are a bit weird, you know, a bit different, uh, but not that different. I mean, they look at the two names of the presidents are Vladimir and Vladimir. Um, you know, there's so much similarity between the two nations. But Ukraines are uh you know Ukrainians are not Russians, they are proud people and they're proud to you know have their own country. This is a hard-fought win they had for them, and this was one of their big things in 1991 was giving up that safety net of nuclear weapons to gain their independence and gain sort of yeah a step away from Moscow. So this is a shocking move by Russia, uh, and one that will hurt them for a very long time to come.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. And just to add a sort of level of realism to it all, um my my girlfriend's company, she has a couple of developers in Lviv in the Ukraine, which is uh one of the westernmost cities very close to the Polish border. And these are people just like me and you, you know, late 20s, early 30s, software developers, and literally they are being told they can't leave their country and they've got to pick up arms and they've got to go and shoot at Russians. And that's so unbelievable, it's unfathomable for uh for me. You know, I just couldn't and it's just uh they happen to be Ukrainian, I happen to be Australian, but there's nothing that different about us. You know, these are people that aren't that they they don't know anything about military, right? They're software developers, they like playing games online and you know, going out and hanging out with their friends, yet overnight so I don't know. Um it's not a very well-crafted sentence or comment, but um it brings it brings it home. This is not a really brings it home, exactly.
SPEAKER_01This is not a a war torn country like Afghanistan. This is not a country that has internal divisions baked in where it's ready to go, like a a Kosovo in a Serbia situation. This is two you know distinct countries with a distinct border, uh, who are now at war on the doorstep of Europe. This is this is absolutely shocking and again, an comp or a very illogical move. You know, it just it the math does not add up and it and it that is the reason that as much as you know everyone goes, ha ha, I told you so with to all these sort of analysts and academics and intelligence guys who thought that Russia wouldn't go in, it's because effectively the the people that thought Putin would gave more weight to emotions and the people that thought Putin wouldn't gave more weight to economics and logic. And it's just shown that in this case you know emotions have uh have become more important than economics and logic which again is something that can only happen in an autocratic nation. If Trump, you know, when he was in power or Biden when he's in power now was to say let's invade Mexico there is a whole apparatus of people who would say to him no we probably shouldn't do that. You know whereas in Russia, you know, looking at the you know there was an amazing press conference a couple of days ago where they're talking about whether they should recognise Donbass and he's brought in these the all these generals to ask what they should do. And one of them goes should we recognise the Donbass goes ah the in my opinion uh we should probably think about a and Putin stops him and goes speak up and stop stuttering should we recognise Donbass? And it was this terrifying tone. And he goes um yeah I think the best option is like yes or no do we recognize yes yes yes we should we should um which just shows you the level that Putin has of authority over his kind of these senior uh senior generals and senior members of staff. You know it's something that you know I there's always something I really enjoy sort of you know pointing out to people you know even when Trump, who again is this was the supreme commander of the military and it shows you kind of what the military can do and not um and this is not a talk on Trump but you know when Trump wanted to bomb Afghanistan with a Moab which is a mother of all bombs is a very very large conventional weapon. He he signed the order on Monday and it hit the ground in Afghanistan on Wednesday. When Trump wanted to ban the trans transgender people from the military oh well sir we've got to make lots of committees and we've got to do this and I'm really sorry sir we've got to look into this and there's got to be an impact study and it actually kind of just fell by the wayside and just got stuck in committees for a million years because it's not a one man military. You know the United States is not just a you know tell them where to go and they go whereas Russia it appears unfortunately is which is which is quite terrifying that we are now you know effectively deciding national policy on the whims of one man who A doesn't even use the internet he actually has his assistants typewriter things up for him and uh and send in hand in pieces of paper. Is that a fact? Jesus Christ that is a fact he doesn't use the internet um you know that's in that's incredible that it is one man deciding all this policy you know it rather than every other country who tends to have an apparatus of people behind their things like this.
SPEAKER_00Yeah that really does compound on the initial motivation of this sort of you know recreation of the old glory of uh of the Soviet Union but um look Michael um that was that was fascinating and I thank you very much for um allocating some of your time to talk to me.
SPEAKER_01No it's been an absolute pleasure I uh absolutely love chatting with you and it's always great to hear another Australian voice. Um you know I have to send you a a packet of Tim Tams and uh and some cherry ripes and whatnot so you don't feel as sad being over in Sweden.
SPEAKER_00Yeah mate cheers bye bye thanks so much