Curious Worldview

#UkraineRussiaWar (+11 Days) - Michael Smith | Xi Jinping Territorial Ambitions For Taiwan

• Michael Smith • Episode 77

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🎙️: https://atlasgeographica.com/michael-smith-taiwan/

This was recorded at 0800 on the 7th of March, CET.

Michael Smith is the North Asian Correspondent for AFR. Michael was a guest on this podcast in #45 where he discussed his sudden evacuation from China and his book, The Last Correspondent.

Michael Smith has been keeping a really close eye on how China, the CCP and Xi Jinping have all been reacting to what is going on in Ukraine. The big question on everybody’s lips is… how does this affect China’s territorial ambition for Taiwan?

In This Podcast With Michael Smith, We Speak About…

  • Territorial Ambitions For Taiwan.
  • China’s Military.
  • Similarities Between Putin & Xi Jinping.

Timestamps With Michael Smith

  • 00:00 – Introduction
  • 00:59 – How Are Territorial Ambitions For Taiwan Affected By The War?
  • 06:29 – How Much Does Xi Jinping Know?
  • 11:29 – How Has The Taiwan Calculation Changed?
  • 16:39 – Nuts & Bolts, What Is Taiwan Worth To China?
  • 19:09 – Tapei Solidarity With Ukraine Aggression Towards China?
  • 21:59 – Timeline Of Xi Reaction.
  • 28:14 – Similarities Between Putin & Xi Jinping.
  • 37:18 – A Sense For China’s Military.

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Links To Michael Smith

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SPEAKER_00

The following is a conversation with Michael Smith. He's the North Asian correspondent for the Australian Financial Review. And he's a former guest on this podcast as well. He appeared on episode number 45 to speak about his book, The Last Correspondent, which sort of details his forced exit from China. Michael's been writing uh quite a bit about the Russia-Ukraine war from the perspective of China and Xi Jinping, thinking about his reactions, um, monitoring closely sort of his movements. So in this podcast, we spoke about really we just tackled from several angles how China's territorial ambitions for Taiwan is affected by everything that's going on in Ukraine with with Russia. This was recorded on Monday the 7th of March at 8 a.m. You'll find links to Michael's work, his articles in AFR as well as as well as his Twitter in the um description of the podcast. And with no further ado, here is Michael Smith. Michael Smith, hello mate from Tokyo. Uh welcome back. Thank you.

SPEAKER_01

Hi Ryan, thanks for having me back again. A lot's happened since we last spoke.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah, a lot has happened. Um and it's my it's my pleasure. I I really um I've been reading what you've been writing about sort of Xi Jinping's role in all of this in AFR, and so I am very happy that I get the opportunity to ask you directly about it. And we could sort of tiptoe around it and sort of slowly build to what the ultimate question is, but I figured we may as well just start with the biggest question, and that is how emboldened or put off does Xi Jinping and China feel about their territorial ambitions for Taiwan, having just witnessed and are witnessing what's going on right now in Ukraine?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, look, Russia's invasion of the Ukraine has triggered an enormous debate about um the future of Taiwan. So concern about Taiwan and China's territorial ambitions in the Indo-Pacific have been building up for some time. I mean, for many years, uh even before we even had an inkling of of what Putin was going to do in the Ukraine. Uh so these concerns have been around for a while, particularly here here in Japan, uh, more that more than many places. But but I think they've really accelerated since the invasion. Um you know, the first interesting, really interesting thing that happened between China and Russia was uh on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics when uh Vladimir Putin jetted in and he had this very high-profile meeting with with Xi Jinping and the Great Hall of the People, and the two leaders signed this quite you know astounding uh communique sort of pledging uh to work together. And I mean I think the wording uh mentioned that you know that there would be no forbidden areas of cooperation. So you know this has really alarmed uh a lot of governments in in Washington and and Canberra and elsewhere, and people were sort of thinking, well, how close are China and Russia really? Uh are they likely to have each other's back when there is a war? Um, would would Russia come to China's aid over Taiwan, uh, vice versa? But um you know, but I think when they had that meeting, you know, a few weeks ago now, um uh there's a lot of speculation that even China, that even Xi Jinping, might not have been aware of the fact that Putin was going to go in so hard uh in the way he did. I mean, I think it served China's interest to back Putin in terms of pushing back against NATO and and the United States. So obviously China and Russia have a uh huge shared interest here in not having the US and Western liberal democracies sort of dominate the world order. Um but what's happened since then is you know Russia's gone into the Ukraine. Uh there's a lot of speculation about whether this is good or bad for China. Um, you know, would Xi Jinping really have sanctioned uh something like this? Does it want to be put in the same basket as Russia? Um, you know, it's not not entirely clear. But um so this has triggered the inevitable debate about about Taiwan. And look, there's two schools of thought here. I mean, two weeks ago, um at the start of this invasion, uh a lot of the serious policy analysts were sort of saying, well, well, this will embolden uh China to act on Taiwan sooner rather than later. Um if if Putin uh could be seen to be sort of using this diplomatic leverage to get his way, well that might be an incentive for for China to do the same and to make its own threats uh to get the US to back off a bit. Um but what we've seen, particularly in the last week or so, you know, this very messy invasion of the Ukraine, it's not quite going uh Russia's way, it's probably going to come at an enormous uh cost to Russia. Um, you've got a very collective pushback from you know from the entire West. And uh, you know, I'm I'm probably siding a bit more with the analysts who are sort of saying, well, this actually might make Xi Jinping think twice about uh trying to take Taiwan because it's obviously going to be messy, it's not gonna be very easy, um, there's gonna be blowback for the Chinese economy if if they go down that path. Um so I think China's obviously watching everything that Russia's doing uh with great interest. Um I think it will learn a lot from what Russia's doing and and will take that on board, but whether it accelerates a push into Taiwan or not is is another question. I'm I'm not sure it will. Um, you know, I think Taiwan, I mean I think China will want to take Taiwan eventually, uh, regardless of what happens in in Ukraine, regardless of of the outcome there. Um but it's sort of a matter of how and and and uh when it decides to do that.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah, and they're going to be paying extraordinary attention to the sort of uh sanctioning side of things, aren't they? Trying to learn how they can become more resilient to what is essentially the playbook now for a an aggressive uh nation. How much can we obviously you can only speculate, um, but you've got a closer ear to this than most. Like, how much did Xi Xi Ping sort of know about Putin's ambitions? It is quite telling that they met right at the end of the games, right before he did the invasion. They are like the caricature two great nations in opposition to the West. They may be, although having a terrible history together, they might hold hands for a little while to like achieve their mutual ambition. Um, is there any sense for that we know how much Xi Jinping knew?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, look, that's a really good question. Because I I think um either way China look comes out of this looking very bad. I mean, if Xi Jinping you know knew about Putin's uh plans and and did nothing to persuade him otherwise, did nothing to alert uh the rest of the world. I mean, it obviously makes uh China uh, you know, look look look sort of very bad. Um and you know, it makes Xi Jinping look implicit to to all the the human suffering going on in Ukraine at the moment. Um I mean the other you know piece of speculation is that that Putin that she asked Putin to hold off on the invasion until after the Winter Olympics was over, so it so it didn't ruin things for him. And look, Putin did, you know, the invasion did happen sort of shortly after the the Games close, so there is an argument that Yeah, just a day or two after the closing ceremony, yeah. That's right, that's right. Um, you know, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry have been asked this question. Did she know about this? And of course they, you know, they they deflected that and didn't really uh answer it. But um look, it's hard to know exactly the the other more common school of thought, and and some very uh respected Chinese policy analysts who really have tentacles into the you know the Chinese diplomatic community and and and the Chinese government, they argue that this really took everyone by surprise. Uh China wasn't uh quite ready for this, um, and they they have been thrown off guard by this. And you know, at the end of the day, they probably China probably doesn't want things to play out uh in the way it is. Um it's not really benefiting China, certainly not in the short term. I mean, there's sort of global economic um upheaval as a result of this, and look, China ultimately, and she ultimately values the stability of the Chinese economy at the moment. Um, so she's got this very big uh political year coming up. So later this year the National People's Congress uh will meet. Um they are very, very likely to endorse him as president for uh for a third term. Um, this is a very controversial um sort of elevation. Um, China doesn't want anything to go wrong this year. Um, and you're seeing it this week, the National People's Congress is is meeting in Beijing, and the emphasis is really on economic stability. They they want to keep stimulating the economy, they they need it to grow, um, they need the Chinese people to remain sort of stable and happy. Um, and I think that is still their priority at the moment. So, you know, Russia's a big risk for them. Um, you know, of course, there could be some upside uh uh for China from uh sanctions against Russia, and of course, you know, China might be able to pick up a lot of oil and gas on on the cheap from Russia, um, so it might not be all bad for the Chinese economy. But um, but at the same time, you know, I don't think, despite everything that China has done, I don't think it wants to be lumped in the same court as as uh a country like Russia. I mean, I th you know China still wants to trade with the US, it still needs Europe, um, it still wants to be a respected member of the global community. Um, so you know, I think it's really torn there. Um, but at the same time, you've got two authoritarian states uh with a with a shared interest uh in not letting the US uh and Europe and NATO dominate the New World Order. So there's a very strong argument to say that this could be an opportunity for China uh to sort of further strengthen its position uh by by siding with Russia. But look, I think it's a very uneasy alliance. As you mentioned before, China and Russia have this long, complex uh history going back to the 17th century, and there's been huge periods in history where there's been no love lost between uh China and Russia. I mean a a a contact of mine who um you know knows China very well, he was saying the view in Beijing is that the Putin's a thug and Russians are thugs and and they don't want to be lumped into the same camp. So I think they're walking a really uh fine tightrope here diplomatically.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah. Um you in your first answer you said that they will take Taiwan eventually. So you sort of see it as uh an inevitable eventuality. Could you maybe just explain why their want for this small island is so strong, given that their goal is further stability for the people and China is in a very perilous um position, right? So they have a myriad of economic issues, right? And so if their goal is stability, and having seen what has happened to uh Russia with sanctions, those sort of equivalent sanctions would just absolutely cripple China because they're even they're even more dependent on the globalized economy than Russia was, um, you know, just energy alone, extraordinarily energy dependent. So if their goal is stability and their goal is also Taiwan, how do they how do they meet in the middle there? Is this a really good sign for Taiwan that it could be pushed back down far the road?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, look, I I I don't think that's gonna happen uh sadly. I think you you know, ultimately China wants Taiwan, China, the Communist Party views Taiwan as as part of mainland Chinese territory, and obviously there's a lot of history uh, you know, involved there. I mean, China, um, you know, Taiwan, the Taiwan we know today was a result of the the civil war in uh in in China in the 60s and the nationalists moving to Taiwan and sort of taking it over. And and I think it's a matter of sort of national pride and deeply ingrained in in uh Communist Party uh history that uh Taiwan will one day be reunified with with China. So there are all those factors and and obviously economically it works uh very well for China. China would love to get its hands on Taiwan just for its semiconductor industry alone. But more importantly, if China can take uh Taiwan, it will have this foothold in the Indo-Pacific. I mean, it will really pave the way for China's dominance in the in the Indo-Pacific and the withdrawal uh of the US. So that obviously has implications for Australia and Japan. Um so it would really cement China's power and in this part of the world. Um, so strategically incredibly important for China. But as you said, in the short term, China doesn't want to mess with its economy. Um, you know, and and on top of that as well, there's there's the threat of um pushback or military action by the United States and its allies if China does try to take Taiwan by force. And of course, that's really complicated because you know the US haven't categorically stated whether they would come to Taiwan's aid military. Strategic ambiguity. That's right, and so you know there's a lot of risky elements here. Would would Xi Jinping want to gamble um gamble that away by sort of trying to take Taiwan? Would the US be willing to take on China here? And there's all kinds of scenarios. Could it escalate into a um a nuclear conflict or you know, a scenario where there's there's nuclear threats uh flying around? So look, I mean no one really knows what Xi Jinping thinks, but um you know, but he plays it pretty safe. I mean, I always look at what happened in Hong Kong as a bit of a read on how Taiwan might play out, and and yeah, I mean Hong Kong's different scenario to Taiwan, it sort of was part of uh China's territory, but but China took Hong Kong almost by stealth during the global pandemic, it introduced these national security laws um which which made it impossible to revive the protest movement, and and it sort of did it peacefully, if you know, for want of a better word, with that without bringing in the PLA. So, you know, so one school of thought is that's it doesn't want to take Taiwan by by force, it could buy at its time, it might be years away, um, it might wait till there's a there's a more sympathetic government uh in Taiwan, but it can use a whole range of measures to bring Taiwan to it to its knees. It could, you know, really hurt the economy, it could use cyber attacks, use misinformation over many, many years to sort of bring Taiwan to its knees and and force Taipei to the negotiating table without uh having to go to the war go to war with the US uh or anyone else. But you know, that's that's one scenario. Um the other scenario is that um you know she does feel a bit more confident and uh decides to move in sooner, sort of sooner rather than later.

SPEAKER_00

If you think about the like unemotional nuts and bolts trade-off, I think it's pretty clear that whatever sort of uh cultural upside and Russian unification upside Putin might get is clearly a bad um trade-off. Can you say unemotionally whether getting Taiwan would be a beneficial trade-off given the huge economic sanctions and potential military threat from the West that China would face in response to trying to take Taiwan?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, well, I think that's the biggest risk for Xi Jinping. And and look, China doesn't really have a history of um you know of uh you know going to war with with other nations. It doesn't it doesn't really like that. I don't think the Chinese people uh want that to happen. It's worked very hard for decades to to build up this sort of very powerful economy, but at the same time it is building up its uh its military. And um I I just can't see Xi taking a gamble at this point in history where he could throw all that away. Um but of course China you know is becoming more and more unpredictable, uh, so you so you never know. I think you know, I think China's a very confident country now. I think it's arrived at this point in history where it feels like it um doesn't need to be pushed around by the United States or or anyone else. Um I think it feels Taiwan is part of its territory, um, and you know it it it is um entitled to to make this kind of move. But yeah, I just think particularly this year, I don't think they want to risk damaging the Chinese economy. I think Xi really wants to get to the end of the year, um, get through COVID as well. That's that's another hurdle for the Chinese economy, um, become leader again for another five years, but um, but definitely get the wheels in motion for something to happen. But at the same time, you look at the what is happening with with the global order, the rise of authoritarian powers, and and this is all coming to a uh head at the moment with with Russia and Ukraine. So, you know, I think if Putin does get his way, um gets the the West to back off in any way, well, it it doesn't bode well for um for Western liberal democracies at all, and um, you know, China will probably use this to its advantage at some stage.

SPEAKER_00

Given the fact that Taiwan has this giant target on its back, the Taipei Tower, uh, which is like, I don't know, the centre point tower in Sydney or a great landmark in any big city, they shone the blue and yellow uh light to signify solidarity with Ukraine. Was this a little bit this clearly an act of defiance against China? It's more than just signalling solidarity with Ukraine, but was it a little bit unnecessary, like a bit of a you know, uh I don't I don't know a good turn of phrase, but is it a little bit unnecessary? Yeah, yeah, like unnecessarily poking them.

SPEAKER_01

Yeah. I think the um Taipei, the Taiwanese government is certainly using the situation in in Ukraine to sort of really push its argument and to you know to to get the West to rally um rally around it um for sure, and and I I don't blame them. I mean I think they're really using the Russian situation to to say to the West, hey, you know, democracy's under threat here, you've got to help us, you've got to come to our aid, and and we very, very strongly support the Ukrainian people, and I think that's been very clear. I mean, I think there's been lots of um demonstrations in the streets in in Taiwan over the last week or so in support of Ukraine, and that also reflects the feelings of the Taiwanese people who you know, I think they see themselves as Ukrainians at the moment. They really don't want um China moving in and taking control of the country, and and you know, that sentiment in Taiwan's been really building up for the last few years, particularly because of what happened in in Hong Kong. I think most Taiwanese people saw uh what happened in in Hong Kong and realize one country, two systems can't work, they don't trust the Chinese Communist Party. Um, so yeah, the Taiwanese government is um certainly using this to send a message to the West. And look, the West is responding. I mean, the United States um last week sent this very high-level uh delegation of sort of former security officials uh into Taiwan, and that was a bit of a show of defiance. That was the US saying, hey, we recognize Taiwan, we share your concerns, um, and sort of sticking it to China a little bit. So there's provocation going on on both sides here, and I guess that's when the threat of a conflict can escalate if the US um you know move too quickly and too aggressively on this issue of Taiwan's independence, which it still doesn't formally recognize, um you know, at what point will there be a trigger where where China responds?

SPEAKER_00

Um could could you just say for the record how Xi Jinping has reacted to this almost step by step since it started, just so we know officially where the the state is at?

SPEAKER_01

On the Ukraine, yeah. Yeah. Um yeah, look, I think the you know, in in more recent weeks, it was the meeting on the the night of the opening ceremony of the the Beijing games, he he sat down with Putin. Uh they released this sort of very strong uh communique outlining uh their willingness to to cooperate uh with each other. And I think you know, at the time there was sort of speculation building up, you know, could there be a simultaneous invasion of Ukraine and Beijing would make a move on Taiwan at the same time? But I think um you know I think that's a worst-case scenario. I don't think there's any sign that's gonna happen. There's certainly no sign that China's getting ready to invade Taiwan at all. Um now, since then, since um Russia did move on Ukraine, look, China, um, you know, some people say China's sitting on the fence, but it's but it's doing more than that. It's indirectly supporting uh Russia's uh actions in the Ukraine by not condemning them. It hasn't condemned them. Uh the Chinese Foreign Ministry have repeatedly refused to call it an invasion. You know, they're asked by journalists every day, is it invasion? They they really play this down. Uh Chinese state media have really played um, you know, really played the whole thing down. Um China's consistently blamed the US and NATO for what's happening uh in Ukraine. Um so indirectly, you know, it is it is backing Putin. It hasn't sort of actually come out and said that. Um the language has shifted a little bit uh in the in the last week or so. I think the foreign Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi um had a meeting with his counterpart in Ukraine and he did make a statement afterwards, you know, calling for restraint from both sides. I mean they didn't just sort of ask Russia to show restraint, but but and I think he said China was very alarmed at what was happening there. There were some references to the um you know to the danger to civilians in Ukraine. So the language sort of shifted a bit, and and that prompted a lot of analysts to sort of speculate that um that China was actually a bit caught out by this, China is actually a bit concerned um as to how the whole situation is playing out. Um but China's also trying to position itself as the good guy and all this. Um it repeatedly says, look, it's willing to act as a negotiator between uh Russia and the Ukraine. Um, but at the same time, it's not, it doesn't seem to be putting any pressure on Putin to um.

SPEAKER_00

And they're not fooling anyone that they are actually.

SPEAKER_01

No, I mean they're not telling Putin to put down the weapons and and uh start talking at the same time. Um so the language is shifting uh a little bit. It's sort of unclear. It's going to be really interesting to see how the whole sanctions uh issue plays out. So China won't implement sanctions against Russia. It's it's been very public um in its belief that it doesn't support sanctions, and that's for an obvious reason because it's been the target of Western sanctions uh many times. Um but it's gonna be really interesting to see whether, you know, is it gonna start buying a lot more Russian oil and gas? Um will it let will Chinese companies breach these Western sanctions against Russia? Uh there'll be implications for them if if that happens. Um so so it is gonna be quite interesting to see how much support uh China actually gives Russia. I mean, my feeling is it will be uh fairly conservative, it just wants to stay out of this and um you know it won't do anything that that that sort of hurts its own economy and gets the West any more offside than it could be with China at the moment.

SPEAKER_00

Do you have any indication as to how much direct communication the states have between each other and by I mean Russia and and China? Um because clearly they met, that's you know a signaling act for the rest of the world to know. But I'm just always curious how much do they actually talk to each other to actually know what's going on? D is there any chance that they exchange emails and stuff like this?

SPEAKER_01

Well, I think um Putin and Xi did have a phone call, I think, uh late last week, was about a week ago, um, and that was covered in in Chinese state media. So they did have a phone call. Look, I'm I'm pretty confident um if Putin's going to answer the phone to anyone, it's probably gonna be Xi Jinping um before anyone else. So I'm I'm pretty confident there are channels of communication, certainly their foreign ministers and Xi Jinping and Putin uh are speaking on on the phone. Um, you know, whether Russia's telling China everything that it's up to is is another question. I mean they all have their own own intelligence. Um so it so I think they are talking. It's just done, you know, and and people talk about this sort of great friendship that Xi Jinping and and Putin uh have, and there's reports that they actually do get on quite well, and they do, you know, Xi Jinping supposedly respects uh Putin, but um it's hard to say how much that personal relationship will play out uh in diplomatic relations between the two countries. Yeah. It it's just hard to say. I mean, it's it's pretty safe to say if one single power could could persuade Russia to stop or or stop Russia. It's probably China's the only one left, really. Um but whether if Xi Jinping picked up the phone and said stop it now, would would Putin listen or not? Probably not, it's hard to say. Yeah.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah. Alright, Michael, look, I just got um two more questions for you. One um at the end about Chinese military spending, because I thought that was really interesting that you read about as well. But first, I couldn't help but I mean I am not this isn't my observation, this is a very commonly held observation, but the the similarities between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Um, because whilst they are from two opposite cultures and have had different life experiences, they nonetheless find themselves the the sole decision maker, effectively, of huge populations, and in China's case, the second most significant economy in the world, in Russia's case, a pretty lousy economy, but they have a lot of energy, so therefore they are uh a more powerful um play than they than an equivalent GDP uh economy to theirs might otherwise be. So for so long, people looked at Putin generally as like a meme, almost, you know. Uh and this is maybe just my own generation uh projecting onto it, because I know that if you've been around for a longer time, you wouldn't have seen it that way. But for me, you know, like he was an obvious thug, but he sort of did things over there, and you know, Russia's a bit of a crazy place, and that's how things are done, so I suppose he's the right man for the job. It's kind of like a very simplistic take, but nonetheless, I think it's kind of how a lot of people uh would have seen him, myself included. Um, and it turns out, you know, yeah, he's one man in charge of 145 million people. That's an enormous population in Russia, and all policy decisions are essentially at his beck and call. He decides how to direct these huge forces. Now, you that exact same comparison can easily be made of Zet. He's a bit of a meme guy, you know, he's uh people don't know necessarily how evil he might be or how innocent he might be, but he's in charge of 1.4 billion people. So how prophetic is Putin's public image downfall in the last weeks as people have sort of seen, holy crap, this is a really bad state of affairs that one man is in charge of 145 million people, who it turns out most of that 140 million, well not most, but a significant amount of that 145 million are not interested in what's going on. How prophetic is his public image downfall, and how worried should we be about Xi's exact same grip on China and what other comparisons can be made there?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, I mean that's the really scary thing about this whole situation, the the rise of the the rise of authoritarianism, I suppose, uh in a world where the the liberal democratic order seems to be waning, particularly the the influence the US uh has over the global order. And and of course, you know, the the US, despite all its faults, is still a democracy. It's its president answers to the people, it answers to a legal system, to the courts, all kinds of checks and balances. And then you've got, yeah, as you said, you've got Xi and Putin, uh two leaders in charge of enormously powerful countries, huge economies, and they don't answer to anyone, really. I mean, they they can do exactly what they want. Um, there's no elections, and I think Putin's very similar to Xi in terms of, you know, they don't tolerate any kind of dissent, um, and they don't seem to have any challenges with it within their own ranks. I mean, that's that's the big similarity. So, I mean, you know, Xi certainly has this incredibly tight grip on power, and unless there's something going on at senior levels of the party that we don't know about, um, he doesn't have any challenges. There are no sort of factions in the Communist Party uh seeking to challenge him. Look, I'm sure there are a lot of people that don't agree with what he's doing, but um, you know, if you disagree with Xi Jinping in China, you you disappear, or or worse. Um, and look, Putin's in a in a similar position. Um and that's when it gets really scary because you've just got two individual individuals, and you know, we don't actually know a lot about Xi Jinping's personality. I mean that that's the kind of weird thing that a lot's been written about his childhood and and how he rose up through the ranks of the party. Um, but you know, since he became leader, we don't know anything about him. He doesn't do interviews. Um you know, we we know who he's married to and who his kids are, but but we don't really know uh what he's like or what's really driving him. We probably know a little bit more about uh about Putin and and his uh characteristics, but um yeah, so you know, so they do share those common traits, and perhaps that's something that uh has drawn them together. I mean it seems like you know they have a bit of respect for each other. Um yeah, so I I think that's what they they have in common.

SPEAKER_00

But people don't I think uh generally wouldn't see Xi Jipping as dangerous of a character as they nay as they now see Putin, right? And it was no sorry, yeah.

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, yeah, that's the second element of your question. And and you know, without knowing how Xi Jinping thinks, I I don't think he wants to be lumped into the same box as as Putin. I mean, I think there is an element of thought uh amongst Chinese leadership that the Russians are still a uh a bunch of thugs, or the Russian leadership are still a bunch of of thugs, and and China's a much more powerful uh country. I mean, I think China would still like to be respected uh on the world stage. I mean, it's it's done so much damage to its soft power over the last few years, particularly with all this Wolf Warrior diplomacy. But I think at the end of the day, Xi Jinping wants to be respected, he wants to be taken uh seriously. He he you know he doesn't want the whole world uh offside and ganging up against him. Um so I think he must be sitting back and looking at um what's happening to Putin and thinking, you know, that I don't want that to happen to me. So look, this could be, you know, maybe wishful thinking, it could be influencing uh the way he acts um in in coming years, particularly with China's sort of own territorial ambitions. Um having said that, I think he still believes Taiwan's part of China and and you know he will still do whatever it takes to reunify Taiwan uh with mainland China, possibly during his leadership in his lifetime.

SPEAKER_00

I guess what I'm trying to do is just uh further tarnish the public opinion of Xi Jinping. Because you know, Putin is the same person he was one month ago with the same economy, same ambitions, but his public image is two different things. Right now, people literally are calling they're making endless comparisons to him being Hitler. I think that's wrong, but like he's clearly a war criminal at this stage, right? So he's at the bottom of public opinion. There is no one left to like him except for the conspiratorial types. Xi Jinping isn't seen the same way, yet he's capable of these things because he's one man in charge of a giant popular giant military. So maybe I didn't craft the question that well, but that's what I'm trying to do. I'm just trying to change whoever's listening to this, just think of Xi Jinping in much more malicious, bad-intended um frame.

SPEAKER_01

Yes.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah, yeah.

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, no, I think I think despite everything Xi Jinping's done and the and the human rights abuses in China and the way China behaves on the world stage, he yeah, he's certainly not in Putin's league. He's you know, they're they're not invading another country, they're not killing, you know, China are not coming in somewhere and and killing civilians. Um and and China's constantly holding itself up as a um as a respectable global citizen, uh a peace negotiator. I mean, Xi gives speech out after speech about you know the common good of mankind. Um, and and I think he wants to be seen that way. He wants to be taken seriously, uh, he wants China to be taken seriously. So yeah, you're right. I don't think um he doesn't want to be seen as a as an as another Hitler, and um, and I think this is a situation he will want to invade, and for that reason, yeah, I just can't see Xi waking up tomorrow sending the PLA into Taiwan and massacring hundreds of thousands of people. I I don't think that's his style. Um, and you know, I I I don't think he wants to be branded a a thug um or or a bully or or worse either. So I th I you know I think he'll be taking all this into consideration.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah. Uh uh finally, um Michael, I see that I've maybe taken too much of your time. I hope you don't mind. Um but China has um yes, your last piece was on China's defense spending. Can you give us a sense of the Chinese military, the capacity, capability, and make comparisons if possible?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, I mean I don't have the numbers, but um, I mean China, the National People's Congress met this week, so uh they announced a 7.1% uh increase in in defence spending. Um and look, this is not unusual. China's been ramping up its defence spending for years and years. I just think there's a lot more uh attention on it uh at the moment. The the really interesting uh trigger point will be 2027 when China has set a target to have what it calls a you know a full and fully modernized military, a fully modernized People's Liberation Army. So that um includes lots of things, you know, it's ramping up its military technology capabilities. Um, and people say, look, that that could be a trigger point for for moving on Taiwan when it's it's really confident uh about its military ability. I mean, there's a lot of analysis done on who's got the stronger military, US or China. Um I mean a lot of experts say the US would struggle to defend Taiwan uh in this patch of the world. Um its naval capabilities are probably weaker than China's. Um that's that's not to say we're not talking about globally, if China sort of you know tried to invade the US, they probably wouldn't have a chance there. But um but in this patch of the world, I think there's a very strong argument to suggest that if if China and the US were willing to throw everything out it, that that China uh could possibly win. And you know, and China's a nuclear power as well, don't forget they don't have as they have a fraction of the number of nuclear weapons that the US has or or Russia has, but they still have them, so they they can always use the nuclear threat uh as as a deterrent. But um, but it certainly has the technology, it has the manpower, it has a very strong people's liberation army, and it certainly has the um the capability to take Taiwan if it really wanted to.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah. My next question was about nukes. Do we know how China thinks about them? They've clearly never, you know, used, well, only one country's used one, but do we know how China is thinking about nuclear weapons?

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, look, it's not something they talk about very often, and I think there's a sense, you know, there's certainly no North Korea, they're not going to be sort of um threatening people with nuclear attacks. I don't think there's a history of China uh ever doing that, so I don't think we can put them in the same camp as as Russia or North Korea. So so no, not at all. Um I I just you know, I don't think a nuclear war is something that China would be even willing uh to toy with. I don't think it's something the Chinese people would would tolerate. And and of course, this is another thing. If you know, if if the situation with Russia-Ukraine does uh become some kind of nuclear threat, even if it's in Europe, but China doesn't want this. I mean, of course, you know, no one wants this, but um a huge amount of risks to to China and its own population, its economy, uh, if something like that happens. So I just don't think that's a path China would want to go down. But again, if it got to a point uh with Taiwan between China and the US, I mean some some academics theorized that uh China could play the nuclear card and and threaten the US in in that way.

SPEAKER_00

Like saying back off, this is ours. Yes, if you can.

SPEAKER_01

Yeah, I mean, you know, would they push the button? No, I'd really hope not. Um, and and no one really knows. But it hasn't been a big sort of talking point. Um, you know, it's not something China talks about much.

SPEAKER_00

Yeah. Alright, Mike. Well, uh, is there anything left on the table at this moment relevant uh for China to the war that you um would like to say?

SPEAKER_01

Not not really. I I guess in this part of the world, I think the situation playing out in in Europe at the moment with Ukraine is being watched very closely in the Indo-Pacific and this part of the world. I think it's um I think it's seen as a real litmus test um as to how China might behave over Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific in in general. So I think it's all it's all interconnected.

SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much, Michael. Thank you. And I uh look forward to speaking with you again. Thanks for the update.